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Recent Books
Book Review
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, By Roberto Mangabeira Unger. New
York: The Free Press. 1975. Pp. ix, 336. $12.95.

I.
When the conjunction of two abstract nouns forms the title of
a philosophical book, the book's thesis can often be summarized by
changing conjunction to copula. For Professor Unger, knowledge
is politics: solutions to the_basic problem of epistemology-what can
we know?-presuppose and in turn are presupposed by solutions to
the basic problem of political theory-_how ought society to be organized? Critical appraisals of proposed or received doctrine in either
of these areas that ignore the reciprocal implications for and of the
other are doomed to remain but partial critiques. Unger's goal, in
contrast, is "total criticism," by which one should perhaps understand,
not that the analysis proceeds without presuppositions, but only that
it proceeds with the conscious aim of doing what has just been indicated: reducing to as few categories as possible the connections between current modes of thought about both what can be known and
how society should be organized. The result is a description of
received visions in each area that Unger finds defective in similar
respects and for similar reasons: both visions share a small set of
related and analogously faulty premises.
The faulty premises derive primarily from doctrines espoused by
Hobbes and, in varying degree, by Locke, Bentham, and other contributers to classical, seventeenth century liberal thought. These
doctrines, Unger suggests, point to moral arbitrariness in ethics and
to overriding concern for the individual in the organization of society.
Moral arbitrariness results because liberal "psychological" premises
(the knowledge half of the inquiry, which includes for Unger both
ethics and epistemology) assert that reason and desire are separate
and that a whole is simply the sum of its parts. Reason thus cannot
choose among ends, which are the dictates of random individual desire, but can perform only the instrumental role of choosing means
most likely to further such ends. The principle of individualism
guides the organization of society because parallel premises of liberal
political thought assert that values are subjective and that the attributes of a group are reducible to the attributes of its members. Thus
the State's only role is to restrain the "mutual antagonism" that results .from the struggle to satisfy individual wants.
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A critique of these "liberal" premises, as of the premises of any
theory, may proceed either from within, through a demonstration of
internal inconsistency, or from without, by showing that the theory
inadequately accounts for experience. Unger's critique does both.
The postulates of liberal thought, he argues, lead to "antinomies"
or conflicts among "conclusions derived from the same or from
equally plausible premises."1 The "antinomy of reason and desire,"
for example, arises because the premises of liberal psychology lead
to two equally untenable moral theories: a morality of reason and
a morality of desire. The former, of which Kant's theory is an example, supplies all that reason can in the way of moral guidance
given the premise of arbitrary desire: it provides principles capable
of commanding universal assent from individuals with disparate ends
only because the principles are so abstract that they provide no guidance in real cases. Kant's categorical imperative, the Golden Rule,
the familiar "treat like cases alike" are all examples: they are
empty formal directives, useless in the critical judgmental operation
of determining "relevant" similarities and differences among the distinct objects of experience.
The morality of desire ( which includes, for example, utilitarian
theories that direct one to "maximize satisfactions") fares even
worse. It is hardly a morality at all, but only "an inadequate descriptive psychology" (p. 52), toting up and comparing desires as given
with nothing to say to the individual who wants to know what he
should desire. Moreover, viewed as a moral doctrine, Unger finds
it inadequate: it points to a life in which contentment, defined as
the satisfaction of desire, can never be achieved because desire never
ceases. Thus "two equally untenable and [conflicting] moral doctrines seem to follow from the postulates of liberal psychology"
(p. 54).
In Unger's view, what gives rise to such antinomies is "the more
fundamental problem of the universal and the particular." We can
make sense of our ideas in science, morals, and politics, Unger
claims, only by distinguishing between a universal element and a particular element: between theory and fact in science; between reason
and desire in ethics; between rules and the values rules serve in politics. But this separation, though necessary, is impossible to uphold:
Whenever we think of [the universal] as independent from [the
particular], we end by recognizing their interdependence. Whenever
we start by conceiving them as interdependent, we are forced to the
conclusion that they must be independent. [p. 137]
The primary aspects of experience ·that liberal thought subverts
are the conception of self or personality and the idea of community.
1. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
by page number only).

AND

Pouncs 13 (1975) (hereinafter cited in the text
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On the one hand, the morality of desire projects a portrait of the
self as an unconnected sequence of arbitrary, changing desires, having nothing necessarily in common with the same self over time or
with the rest of mankind. It thus denies both "the continuity and
the humanity of the self'' (p. 57). The morality of reason, on the
other hand, whose formal, indeterminate laws ignore individual strivings, has an opposite and equally unhappy consequence: negation
of the self's "capacity for moral innovation and its individual identity"
(,p. 57). On the social level, these consequences are reflected in the
schizophrenic flight of the individual, first to the demands of public
role and convention (the political analogue to formal reason, which
leads to submission or resignation), then back to the inclinations of
private life (the analogue to arbitrary desire, which leads to disintegration of the sense of unity with others). "To suffer at the same
time from resignation and disintegration has become the ordinary circumstance of the moral life" (p. 62).
What is the way out?· Why suppose, for that matter, that there
is a way out? The predicament, after all, is an old one, as familiar
in the history of philosophy as are most of Unger's arguments. The
predicament may be described, as Unger chooses to describe it, in
terms that point to the riddle of the relationship between the particular and the universal. It may also be described in less metaphysical terms as arising out of the limits of human ability to find authority
or certainty in science or morals. If science could accept the view
that things have intelligible, knowable essences, one would not have
to be content with the relativity of definition and theory to purpose.
If values were objective and knowable, moral disagreement would
diminish as knowledge increases. In either case, if "God" would
"speak," as Unger pleads at the end of his book (p. 295), the quest
for authority could end. But Unger's plea, while it points to one
particular path that the quest for certainty often takes, also points
to the intell~tual's despair over finding or accepting such a path
himself.
All of these possibilities for finding authority depend, in short,
on hypotheses modem man is unable to accept. Unger's book may
be viewed as an invitation to take another look at the "unacceptable"
hypotheses in the hope of finding at least one point sufficiently open
to doubt to justify an attempt at intellectual revision. Such revision,
Unger concedes, cannot take the form of outright denial of any of
the premises of liberal psychology. One cannot simply assert that
things have intelligible essences or that values are objective or that
God has spoken. No such "philosopher's trick" (p. 17) can hope to
affect the social experience of moral disagreement, scientific uncertainty, and unrevealed divine truth that gives such force to the postulates of liberal thought. One must start instead on a smaller scale,
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revising liberal premises not in toto, but only as they apply to one
particular phenomenon in the world: man himself.
In metaphysical terms, Unger, with a bow to Hegel, 2 proposes
to solve the problem of the relationship between the universal and
the particular that underlies the antinomies by viewing persons as
"concrete universals." Unger's claim that this notion is easier to
understand or accept than an outright denial of one or more of the
liberal postulates rests on his suggestion that persistent aspects of experience, despite the pervasive influence of liberalism, support such
a "foreign" way of thinking. Moral experience confirms that concrete examples (as in the case of parables) contain general lessons
that cannot be reduced to abstract rules. Works of art convey universal meaning that cannot, however, be abstracted from the particular work itself. Finally, the Christian dogmas of the incarnation and
the resurrection illustrate a view of the relationship between infinite
and finite quite different from the view of the relationship between
universal and particular that underlies the antinomies of liberal
thought (see pp. 143-44).
This is not to say that one must accept Christian dogma in order
to accept Unger's invitation. Unger is not attempting to persuade
one of the existence of a heavenly kingdom, but of the possibility of
establishing a kingdom of man on earth that significantly improves
on the only kingdom that Unger believes liberalism is capable of supporting. Like Marx and Weber, Unger is sensitive to the connection
between theoretical doctrine and social experience and to the difficulty of meaningfully altering the one without simultaneously altering
the other. His aim in the first half of the book is to discover aspects
of present experience capable of evoking the reader's empathy for
both the critical analysis of liberalism and an alternative view of _man
and society. This alternative view seeks conditions that will allow
fuller realization of both man's individual or "concrete self' and
his sociable or "abstract self' (pp. 222-26). It is a view that rejects both extreme individualism (under which community collapses)
2. Id. at 312 n.24. Parallels to the structure and substance of Hegel's thought
may be found throughout Unger's book. In particular, both emphasize the synthesis
of opposing intellectual ideas through a movement: that occurs between stages of society and emerging conceptions of value and truth; that leads to an increasing realization in history of the value of freedom; and that is motivated by the struggle to
realize in history an ideal that is expressed in the idea of God. The most significant
difference between Unger's theory and Hegel's (or Marx's) is that Unger makes no
claim that the process is in any sense inevitable or likely (even in theory) to succeed.
This difference between the theories of Unger and Hegel leads Unger to resist
strongly attempts to characterize his work as Hegelian. See exchange of correspondence between Professor Unger and Professor Kronman, 61 MINN. L. REV. 200
(1976) (commenting on Kronman's review of Knowledge and Politics). Unger admits that his position shares with Hegel's a "background of Christianity"; however;
by insisting on the earthly unattainability of the ideal, Unger's work is "Christian"
in a way that Hegel's is not. "The effort to participate in the dialogue between
Christianity and modernism is one of the ruling ambitions of the work." Unger, 61
MINN. L. REv. at 200, 203.
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and extreme collectivism (under which self disappears). In place
of these extremes, Unger seeks a synthesis and sense of social union
similar to that discussed in a recent work by John Rawls, 3 who, it
should be noted, starts from quite different, "liberal" premises. The
guiding idea, which Rawls suggests "is surely implicit in numerous
writings," 4 is that individuals in an ideal community will come to accept and sympathetically share in community choices different from
the individual's own because community ends will increasingly reflect the individual's "species nature." At the same time, preservation of individual freedom to participate in the selection of ends and
to develop particular talents and roles will facilitate continual community revision of its view of the nature of the "species," thus allowing for individual variation and species development in a manner
reminiscent of the urgings of no less a liberal than J. S. Mill.5
Thus the stage is set for a transition from the critical argument
to the construction of Unger's positive program. The assumptions
of the program are boldly stated: ( 1) there is a unitary human
nature, not in the form of an eternal "essence" revealed by reason,
but in a form capable of developing and changing as man makes
choices through history; (2) this nature will be revealed by common
choices maintained over time in societies, assuming that such societies are free of domination and thus do not work a corrupting influence on the "shared values"; (3) the development of man's potential
-the talents, the skills, the ends revealed by these shared valuesis the good. "Evaluation and description meet at the point at which
one defines human nature" (p. 196).
The implications of this alternative view are developed with care
and insight in the final chapters of the book. These chapters connect Unger's "Theory of the Self' ( ch. 5) with his examination of
the society ( "The Theory of Organic Groups" ( ch. 6) ) that must exist
in order to provide the domination-free conditions under which the
ideal self can develop. Chapter four ("The Theory of the WelfareCorporate State") lays the groundwork for both analyses by examining the respects in which existing states fail to meet the "dominationfree" qualification. The post-feudal liberal state, whose "master
institution," the bureaucracy, ideally tries to allocate social place according to role, fails to meet the qualification because the principle
of role appeals to a standard of merit, and "merit" is inevitably influenced in the liberal state by class. Moreover, even if the welfarecorporate state ( or, for that matter, the socialist state) could succeed
in dispensing with the influence of class by assigning place solely on
the basis of merit, "the exercise of power by the higher talents over
3. See J. RAWLS, A TuEORY OF JUSTICE 520-30 (1971).
4. Id. at 523 n.4.
5. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 100-33 (ch. III) (London 1859).
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the less gifted becomes simply another form of personal domination
unless a moral standard can be found to justify and limit it" (p. 173).
Escape from domination in the meritocratic bureaucracy is possible,
Unger argues, only if two conditions can be met: (1) members of
the institution must participate "equally and continuously in the
formulation of common ends" (the condition of democracy) (p. 183);
(2) social relations must be "based on shared purposes whose moral
authority is recognized and in which men view and treat one another
as concrete and complete beings" (the condition of community)
(p. 184).
What would a society that fulfilled these conditions look like?
Unger provides a speculative glimpse in his final chapter. The
features that emerge can be briefly listed, but cannot be appreciated
or fairly evaluated except in the context of the sustained argument
that leads to them. Much of the discussion at this point draws on
familiar sociological themes. Increased sympathy, for example, requires in Unger's view the same "intimate face-to-face association
and cooperation" found in such "primary groups" as the family. 0
But, as others have observed, such primary groups cannot foster the
sense of community as long as they remain "detached from positions
of functi~nal relevance to the larger economic and political decisions
of our society." 7 Thus Unger suggests that one must seek face-toface association within groups that are organized to deal with the
broad economic and political decisions affecting members of the
group. The closest example of such a community is the emerging
occupational group, united at first only by the production goals of
the working place, but capable of becoming a "community of life"
through the provision of joint facilities for housing, health care, education and recreation (pp. 264-65). Drawing on the literature of
alienation from Marx to Durkheim, Unger suggests that within such
groups the division of labor must leave room for individual choice
and experimentation, encouraging people to see and treat each other
"as concrete individuals rather than as role occupants" (p. 261).
With this in mind, the salient features of the positive program
may be briefly summarized. They include: (1) "organic" groups,
faced with a broad range of life situations, but small enough to allow
face-to-face dealings among all of the members; (-2) a basic freedom
on the part of individuals to join and leave such groups; (3)
diminished importance of talent, with any assignment of roles by
merit representing a political, collective choice, rather than a technical given; (4) distribution of benefits according to a standard that
combines merit and need, with "basic needs" to be satisfied independently of capacity or effort; (5) flexible division of labor, with
6. See C.H. COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 23-38 (1909).
7. R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 54 (1953).
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' less emphasis on specialization and greater room for individual experimentation and choice, including, for example, rotation of tasks
and the sharing of indispensable but "generally abhorred" tasks as
a "common burden" (p. 275).

II.
Those accustomed to evaluating argument and analysis by the
standards of professional philosophy will find much to criticize in
Unger's book. How, for example, can one categorize Kant with
Hobbes as thinkers equally responsible for doctrines suggesting that
values are subjective and arbitrary? It was, after all, precisely the
attack of British empiricism on the basis for belief in the authority
of science and morals that led Kant out of his "dogmatic slumbers"
to the formulation of a theory designed to justify such beliefs. How,
for that matter, can one in a few pages dismiss all varieties of utilitarianism as inadequate "moralities of desire" on the basis of arguments that are at least as old as Plato8 and that few professional
philosophers would accept as conclusive, much less self-evident?
Not all consequentialist ethical theories require the naive calculus of
the way to "contentment" that Unger seems to take as the model
for his attack. Moreover, the claim that liberal psychology condemns
reason to a purely instrumental role with nothing to say about the
choice of ends would be dismissed by some as either trivially true
or false. One can reason about ends more or less likely to produce
happiness (perhaps by reference to those same aspects of human
nature that Unger describes), even though the proof that happiness
itself is the ultimate end rests, like all first principles, beyond the reach
of reason.
These reactions, however, can result only from a failure to
appreciate Unger's objective. Knowledge and Politics is not an exercise in the history of philosophy or a commentary on or analysis
of any particular philosopher or philosophical theory. 9 Unger is
8. See PLATO, GoRGIAS (B. Radice & R. Baldick eds. 1960).
9. In this respect, the exchange of correspondence between Professors Unger and
Kronman, published with the latter's review of Unger's book, see note 2 supra, is
puzzling. In his review Kronman criticizes in some detail Unger's tendency to ignore
or to treat superficially the responses philosophers have given to many of the problems Unger discusses. It seems to me that Unger's only defense to such criticism,
as well as to the charge that he "treats too cavalierly, and at times positively misrepresents, the views of classical liberal thinkers," Kronman, 61 MINN. L. REV. at 205, is
his repeated insistence that he is painting his own picture in Knowledge and Politics,
rather than describing the views of any particular philosopher or rehearsing familiarand endless--"partial" philosophical debates. See KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 8-11,
106, 118-19. See also id. at 293-94 (on the limits of philosophy). In the exchange
with Kronman, however, Unger defends himself as if what is at stake is the precise
relationship of his work with that of other philosophers. The Kronman-Unger exchange is dominated by disputes over whether Hegel is or is not Spinozist, whether
Unger is or is not Hegelian, and whether Unger's book is or is not "Christian." It is
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painting a picture-a metaphor to which he explicitly resorts (see
pp. 14-15)-of the chief elements in the thought and consciousness
of modern man. He identifies elements that typify the basic style
of the post-seventeenth century era, much as one might identify
Baroque style in art without analyzing in detail the variations among
particular paintings or artists (cf. p. 122). He invites the reader to
look and see and to compare with his or her own experience the
portrait that results. The fact ¢.at the themes and arguments are
familiar becomes a basis less for criticism than for conviction that
the portrait is accurate.
On this level, Unger's critique of Kant, and of theories of justice
based on Kant, should strike a responsive chord in anyone who has
tried to apply such theories to practical problems requiring hard
moral or social choices. As for utilitarianism, while Unger does not
pause to make the same detailed critique of such theories that one
can find, for example, in Rawls 10 or Nozick, 11 he weaves his own
version of such critique~ into an account of the causes of moral
skepticism and uncertainty under liberal postulates. Again the resulting tapestry is recognizable. Modern welfare economics, rejecting the relevance of a calculus that might select the choices that an
individual ought to prefer, or despairing of its ability to perform such
a calculus, simply accepts preference curves as given. And to suggest that a prescription to "maximize happiness" can be conceived
broadly enough to include even Unger's theory of human nature as
the good is to make the prescription superfluous. Aristotle too
thought happiness the ultimate end of man. But that became for
him only the starting point for an analysis of human potentiality bearing close affinity in spirit to Unger's theory. Unger, in short, like
the classical Greek philosophers, suggests that developing a theory
of the good is more important than refining a prescription to
maximize whatever results from that theory. It is the preoccupation
of "moralities of desire," however conceived, with the latter refinements that reverses cart and horse and contributes to the sense of
moral skepticism.
This focus on a theory of the good marks Unger's book as a rare
contribution to contemporary Anglo-American philosophical literature; the skill with which the theory is developed makes it a valuable
addition as well. One of the most remarkable characteristics of the
book is its extreme breadth of vision. It encompasses in telling synthesis a vast body of relevant but seemingly disparate sociological,
philosophical, political, and psychological literature. On this level
ironic that while Unger here protests against Kronman's oversimplification of his
position, Unger's synthesis of the views of other thinkers in Knowledge and Politics
is susceptible to similar criticism. .
10. See J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 31, 54-194.
11. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26-53 (1974).
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of broad synthesis, the discussion is rigorous and intellectually honest
in the best scholarly tradition. The argument is coherent, tightly organized, and rich with connections and analogies among fundamental
aspects of human experience and the insights of diverse, speculative
thinkers.
The discussion is also exceedingly abstract, although no more so
perhaps than any philosophical treatise that examines the connections among ideas as basic as those that concern the nature of man,
morals, and society. But unlike treatises that confine their analyses
to "the order of ideas," Unger continually compares the theoretical
order with "the order of social consciousness," giving life to abstract
discussion by reference to experiences ranging from personal,
romantic, and perverse love (pp. 218-19) to the philosopher's quest
for ontological proofs of the existence of God (p. 293) . In each
case, these brief discussions appear, not as diversions, but as integral,
illuminating parts of the argument.
At times, some of these same features make the book difficult
reading. Unger assumes that the reader will be familiar with abstract concepts whose content is not always clear even in the literature he surveys. There must, for example, be less obscure ways of
describing the potential for harmonizing individualism and antiindividualism than by suggesting "a synthesis of transcendence and
immanence" as an "alternative conception of the emergent mentality"
(pp. 180-81). Moreover, the brevity of the arguments and the tendency to quick synthesis, particularly in comparison with the breadth
of the themes treated, adds significantly to the effort needed to follow
the argument. Finally, the style is infused with an air of such personal
conviction and confidence in the analysis that it may prove an irritant, preventing objective appraisal by those who believe that the inability to find solutions to questions as basic as these should generate
humility in even the most enlightened prophet. But these are minor
problems. Compared to much of the current popular literature that
appeals to "new consciousness" movements, Unger's book does a far
better job of examining the theoretical structure of and the prospects
for such anti-liberal movements.
Despite its virtues, however, and despite Unger's candid confrontation, for the most part, of the assumptions on which his positive
program depends, there remain some hidden assumptions that are
crucial to the success of his project. One is that there is something
wrong with antinomies. For Unger the inability to resolve these
represents "the outer limits of our ability to escape tragedy in life"
(p. 141). But tragedy, as the Greeks knew, can be the occasion as
much for exhilaration and admiration"as for sorrow and pity. For
Kant, the antinomies that set the bounds to reason also open up
possibilities for hope and free will that otherwise remain in doubt.
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For some contemporary philosophers who share Unger's view of the
plight of man, the consequence is not despair but welcome recognition of the fact that man's inability to find authority makes faith
possible and lends meaning to life precisely because contradiction
and conflict are accepted as an inescapable part of the human predicament.
Utopian theories have, after all, received a bad philosophical
press of late, not so much or only because they are implausible, but
because they do not appear necessarily preferable to nonutopian altematives.12 Unger insists that his is not a plan for utopia, because
utopias envision a static society isolated in history, whereas Unger
contemplates continued reciprocal development of society and self
through history (p. 237). But if the motivation for the establishment
of organic groups is provided by an ideal that seeks complete resolution of uncertainty in the central aspects of human existence, then
the recognition that only God can achieve the ideal perhaps should
and will at some point eliminate the motivation. In Unger's terms,
should one not consider whether agreement by many about the inevitability and the desirability or beauty of contradiction and conflict
at these basic levels is evidence that human nature is better served
by the acceptance of antinomies? 13
A second assumption is that Unger's positive program will in fact
eliminate or lessen the antinomies of liberalism. Indeed, the most
disappointing feature of the book is its failure to link the proposed
solution to the problems which ostensibly give rise to the proposal.
Consider the problem of adjudication, which for Unger arises out of
"the antinomy of rules and values." Liberal theory reconciles freedom and order by positing impersonal rules whose impingement on
individual liberty is justified because the rules are justified, either
in direct substantive terms or on the basis of the procedures by which
they are selected. But even assuming the rules can be thus justified
(which Unger does not concede), they must still be applied. And
adjudication under the premises of liberal political thought inevitably
forces the law applier to impose his own subjective values, thus
undermining the liberal justification for the restriction on liberty.
Again, the problem is a familiar one, and again, Unger dispatches
it quickly, dismissing in a few short paragraphs recent models of judicial decisionmaking that purport to eliminate such discretionary
judicial power. 14 But Unger's suggestion that shared values and common ends might solve the problem because every decision could then
be judged "according to its capacity to promote the common ends"
12. See, e.g., Dahrendorf, Out of •Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological
Analysis, 64 .AM. J. Soc. 115-27 (1958).
13. Cf. R. NOZICK, supra note 11, at 297-334 (suggesting a "utopian" vision that
emphasizes "individualism" to the point of near-extinction of "community").
14. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. -L. REv. 14 (1967).
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(p. 101) assumes that such ends will be so specific that reasonable
men could not disagree about which decision best promotes them.
Because Unger makes no attempt to speculate about the shared
values and common ends that will emerge from his positive program
(see pp. 241, 245), the basis for this assumption is unclear. Moreover, even if consensus emerges with respect to some ends, others,
even in organic groups, will remain outside the area of core agreement-else there would be less need to lay such stress on the importance of the condition of democracy. But it is in part the condition
of democracy in liberal society, forcing compromises among shifting
minorities, which leads to the problem of adjudication in the first
place, making the "purpose" of majority-selected ends inherently indeterminate (seep. 95). Unger's program, in short, promises at best
only to shift the problem of adjudication from the penumbra that surrounds the contingently accepted values of present society to the
penumbra surrounding the essentially shared values of organic
groups.
Similar problems confront the attempt to find in the positive program a solution to the antinomy of reason and desire. Unger's criticism of the morality of reason as an empty guide to conduct proves
to be based less on his indictment of liberalism than on his view of
the importance of practical or prudential, as opposed to theoretical, moral reasoning. Our ordinary moral concern to know what we
ought to do in the case of concrete problems of choice requires in
Unger's view a theory of practical reasoning that analogizes particulars directly to each other, guiding moral choice by appeal to concrete examples of right conduct rather than to abstract rules or principles. But Unger confesses, "I have no worked-out account of [practical reasoning] to offer, not because I believe such an account to be
impossible or unimportant, but simply because I have not found one"
(p. 258). Absent such an account, the problem of concrete moral·
choice remains equally insoluble in organic groups. Conversely,
with such an account (supplementing a morality either of reason or of
desire) why should it not work as well in liberal society? Even if one
supposes with Unger that practical moral judgments will prove "more
secure" in organic groups, that is a long way from suggesting that the
problem which formed a large part of the critique of liberalism will
be solved by his positive program.
In view of these considerations, and in view of Unger's own
admission that, with or without liberalism, there may be "basic and
ineradicable conflicts" in morals, knowledge, and politics (p. 141),
one may well ask why one should "surrender the safeguards against
evil that liberalism so painfully built" (pp. 247-48) in exchange for
a program that offers little assurance of coming any closer to resolving such conflicts. One can find a better answer to this question
in Unger's book than that provided by his focus on "antinomies."
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The answer lies in Unger's description and analysis of those experiences that individuals sometimes, if rarely, encounter in cases of
aesthetic contemplation, personal love, and religious worship: delight
in being and a sense of meaning that stubbornly resists and confounds the only meaning that liberalism offers. These remain in
current society extraordinary experiences. The motivation for, and
the measure of the success of, Unger's positive program lie in the
promise it holds of extending the extraordinary into the everyday
(see pp. 231-35). It is this possibility of achieving a community that
is "the political analogue of personal love" (p. 220), rather than concern about resolution of antinomies or conflict, that is more likely
to justify attempts to realize Unger's social program.
This conclusion has two consequences. First, it makes Unger's
analysis of the value of and the pre-conditions for achieving greater
social sympathy more important than his claim that liberalism is essentially to blame for the failure to achieve such sympathy. Second,
it tends to undermine that claim. One need not accept Unger's
hypothesis of an objective species nature in order to accept his arguments for the positive program. Indeed, the claim that liberal
psychological premises leave the self with nothing necessarily in common with the rest of mankind proves itself false in one respect: under
those premises, all men at least share in common the same inability to
establish objective values. Why should not recognition of that common plight foster, rather than depress, natural human inclinations for
sympathy and community? Liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith and
Hume, after all, stress the value of sympathy and benevolence as virtues to be cultivated, although Hume admits the natural feeling is
a weak one. 15 Liberals such as Rawls buttress the natural feeling
with a theory designed to establish the rationality of principles of justice that are consistent, as we have seen, with an idea of community
very similar to that explored by Unger. 16 Other rational arguments
for taking the "impersonal view" leading to empathy and altruism
can be made without the aid of a theory of objective value. 17
Unger, in short, may be right that, if his theory of an objective species
nature is correct and can be accepted, it will help motivate and make
more stable the establishment of the positive program. But it would
be a mistake to conclude from Unger's insistence on the "unity of
liberal thought'' ( ch. 3) that one who is unable to escape from the
"metaphysical prison house" (p. 229) of such thought is justified in
thinking that Unger's social theory stands or falls with his moral
theory.
15. See, A. SMITII, THE THEoRY OF nm MORAL SENTIMENTS 1-30 (pt. I, § I, chs.
I-IV) (1967); D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 275-328, 455-70 (bk. II,
pt. I; bk. III, pt. I, § I) (Selby-Bigge ed. 1888).
16. See text at notes 3-4 supra.
17. See T. NAGEL, THE PossmILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970).
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AB for the moral theory itself, its plausibility depends on a final
assumption in Unger's analysis that is not hidden at all but is explicitly confronted. It is the assumption that one can overcome two
profound problems of circularity in the argument for the positive program. Both arise from Unger's basic premises: human nature is
the good (the only objective evaluative standard); human nature is
whatever does not arise from domination; domination is unjustified
power. Under this set of definitions it appears that to determine
human nature one must already have an independent evaluative
standard (apart from human nature) for distinguishing legitimate
from illegitimate power. Unger's response is to suggest that the apparent circle may be turned into a spiral. Advance is slow but
advance does occur. Classical arguments in favor of slavery illustrate the difficulty of knowing where one is in the spiral or even
whether one is proceeding in the right direction (pp. 244-45). But
widely shared moral beliefs now reject the classical arguments. It
is not, in short, hopeless to suggest that the justification of power
is itself to be determined by widely shared 'beliefs capable of becoming increasingly secure, though never final, with each advance.
The second problem is that the entire program is futile from the
outset if it should turn out that domination is itself a basic part of
human nature. One may sympathize with Unger's reluctance to
speculate about the shared values that human nature will reveal in
a yet-to-be-established, domination-free society; but the assumption
that such a society is possible at all already depends on a view of
human nature yet to be established. It is an assumption that prefers
Rousseau's view of man to Hobbes' and that rejects the view of man
implicit in religious concepts of original sin and in scientific and anthropological theories that stress man's link to his animal origins.
Unger's answer is simply to concede the assumption. The premise
that underlies the entire enterprise is a belief in the ultimate
harmony of being and goodness, truth and beauty-a belief that for
Unger excludes the possibility that human nature might be inherently
domination-seeking (see pp. 247-48). It is a view that links reason,
fact, and value in a way that has strong adherents in the history of
philosophy, beginning with Plato. Among contemporary American
legal theorists it is a view that, in a different context, has been given
lonely voice for some time in the writings of Professor Lon Fuller18
and that shows signs of gaining modest support in recent analyses
by other philosophers of the judicial process.19
It is in this basic motivational premise of the undertaking that
the ultimate value of Unger's book is to be found. Knowledge and
18. See L. FuLLER, nm MORALITY OF LAw 159 (1969); L. Fuller, Positivism and
Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. RBv. 630 (1958).
19. See R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CoNDUCT AND SocIAL NORMS 169-73 (1975):
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Politics does not advance inquiry into the questions, what can I know?
and what ought I to do? It does advance inquiry into the question
of Kant's Third Critique, "what may I hope?" Hope, by definition,
entertains beliefs whose plausibility reason cannot establish. But
hope must have some rational structure if it is not to degenerate into
idle dreaming. Unger's entire essay is an attempt to provide such a
structure. It is "an act of hope," pointing "toward a kind of thought
and society that does not yet exist and may never exist'' (p. v). That
it is a kind of society that could exist and is not simply the result
of wishful thinking by those bent on the "quest for community"
Unger, given his premise, demonstrates with passion and precision.
Those who share his faith in the ultimate harmony of truth and goodness will find in Unger a powerful intellectual ally against those who
claim such faith is blind.
Philip Soper
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